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Individual Religious Freedom and National Security
in Europe After September 11
Silvio Ferrari
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1990s, scholars have written about the “revanche
de Dieu”1 and the “deprivatization of religion.”2 Many stressed that
religion, which had been confined to the private sphere of human
life, was reacquiring an important role in the public sphere of human
life. Citing as examples Iran under Khomeini, Poland under Walesa,
and the liberation theologies supporting the revolutionary
movements in Central and South America, these scholars have
explained how religion, by “leaving its assigned place in the private
sphere, had thrust itself into the public arena of moral and political
contestation . . . challenging in the name of religion the legitimacy
and autonomy of the primary secular spheres, the state and the
market economy.”3
Violent conflicts are inevitable when religion enters the public
arena. Once it became clear what an important role religion could
play in the public arena, politicians began using religion to motivate
and mobilize people for political, national, and ethnic struggles. The
events in the Balkans during the 1990s demonstrated the role
religion can play when religious divisions overlap with national and
ethnic differences and also showed how eager religious authorities
were to exploit religion for political reasons.4
Religiously motivated political struggles provided the foundation
for religious terrorism to develop. In the past, religion had
occasionally been a component of political, ethnic, or national
secular terrorism. In Northern Ireland, religion had been one

1. See, e.g., GILLES KEPEL, LA REVANCHE DE DIEU [THE REVENGE OF GOD] (1990).
2. See, e.g., JOSÉ CASANOVA, PUBLIC RELIGIONS IN THE MODERN WORLD 3−6
(1994). The “deprivatization” of religion is the central thesis of Casanova’s work.
3. Id. at 3−5.
4. See generally RELIGION AND THE WAR IN BOSNIA (Paul Mojzes ed., 1998).
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component, but rarely the central component, of terrorism.5
However, in the last ten to twenty years a new breed of terrorist has
appeared: terrorists who are religiously motivated and kill in the
name of God.6 In many cases, hope of a supernatural reward makes
“religious” terrorists indifferent toward their own lives; they are
prepared to die because they are persuaded God will reward their
sacrifice with eternal life.7 The most hideous form of violence,
directed against defenseless civilians, is inextricably related to
religion.
Scholars debate whether religion is the true motivation for
terrorism or whether it is a ploy for recruiting followers and a
medium by which to amplify the impact of terrorist actions.8 For
example, scholars debate whether Osama Bin Laden’s agenda is
actually religious or whether he uses religion to disguise a political
agenda.9 To fight terrorism, it is essential to understand the
terrorists’ motivations. But the debate about the motivations of
terrorist leaders should not make us forget that there are people who
are convinced it is legitimate, even compulsory, to kill in the name of
God. This conviction on the part of some religious adherents—that
religion legitimizes violence—distinguishes modern terrorism and is
at the crux of how to balance individual religious freedom and
national security.
Many important questions have been raised by the post–
September 11 approach to religion and security. Thus, we cannot
simply argue that religious liberty is an inviolable right or that basic
human rights can only be enjoyed in a secure environment. Both
5. For a general overview of Northern Ireland and of hostilities in Ireland, see
Northern Ireland, at http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0108101.html (last visited Mar. 5,
2004).
6. See generally BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM (1998); MARK
JUERGENSMAYER, TERROR IN THE MIND OF GOD: THE GLOBAL RISE OF RELIGIOUS
VIOLENCE 87−129 (3d ed. 2003).
7. For example, the number and determination of the Palestinian shahid (“martyrs”),
who perform suicidal terrorist attacks in Israel, has shocked Europeans. Many of them were
religiously motivated and left messages where the religious motivation of their terrorist act was
clearly stated. See Jean-François Mayer, Religion et terrorisme: La question des attentats suicides:
tactique ou théologie? [Religion and Terrorism: The Question of Suicide Attacks: Tactic or
Theology?] (May 14, 2002), at http://www.religioscope.com/info/articles/009_attacks.htm.
8. See Religion and Terrorism: Interview with Dr. Bruce Hoffman (Feb. 22, 2002), at
http://www.religioscope.com/info/articles/003_Hoffman_terrorism.htm.
9. See generally BBC News, Who Is Osama Bin Laden? (Sept. 18, 2001), at
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/155236.stm.
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statements are correct but are of little help in finding a balance
between the values of freedom and security. Instead, we must
determine how we can reconcile religious freedom and national
security in a way that makes it possible to simultaneously enjoy them
both.
I am convinced that, in the long run, religious liberty helps
develop the integration and tolerance that lie at the foundation of a
stable and safe society,10 but a democratic society must also ensure
that religious liberty does not exploit fundamental human rights.11
Religious movements that have threatened public safety and
security have raised similar concerns in the past two decades, and
past experience with these types of problems has provided guidance
in dealing with post–September 11 security issues. Mass suicides (in
Switzerland, for example) and violence (in Waco, Texas, and
elsewhere)12 persuaded people that some religions can be evil.
However, because they believe that some religions can be evil, a few
European states have overreacted and behaved as though all new and
nonmainstream religious movements are dangerous sects.13
Fortunately, a more measured approach is gradually emerging in the
West,14 where the consensus is that more must be learned about
10. This concept was expressed in a speech given by Pope John Paul II on January 13,
2003: “Believers who feel that their faith is respected and whose communities enjoy juridical
recognition will work with ever greater conviction in the common project of building up the
civil society to which they belong.” Pope John Paul II, Address of His Holiness Pope John
Paul II to the Diplomatic Corps § 7 (Jan. 13, 2003), available at http://www.vatican.va/
holy_father/john_paul_ii/speeches/2003/january/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_20030113_
diplomatic-corps_en.html.
11. The U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief declares in its preamble that “the use of religion or
belief for ends inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, other relevant instruments
of the United Nations and the purposes and principles of the present Declaration is
inadmissible.” Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination
Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 55, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., 73d plen. mtg. ¶ 5, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/36/55 (1981), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/36/
a36r055.htm.
12. See, e.g., CNN, Mass Suicides in Recent Years (Mar. 27, 1997), at http://www.
cnn.com/US/9703/27/suicide.list.
13. The lists of sects prepared in France and Belgium, which combine truly dangerous
movements and perfectly legitimate groups, are a good example of this overreaction. For
France, see generally Vincente Fortier, L’encadrement législatif du phénomène sectaire en
France, 51 REVUE DE DROIT CANONIQUE 21 (2001); FRANCIS MESSNER, LES “SECTES” ET
LE DROIT EN FRANCE (1999). For Belgium, see Rik Torfs, Sekten en Recht, 4 COLLATIONES:
VLAAMS TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR THEOLOGIE EN PASTORAAL 385 (1998).
14. But this is not yet so in the East. In some countries of Eastern Europe, for example,
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these “new” religious movements so that generalizations are
avoided.
Today’s crisis of balancing religious liberty and national security
must also be approached with deliberation. An emotional and
uncontrolled reaction to the events of September 11 could
reproduce the same scenario that has prevailed in the West during
the last twenty years, with Islam playing the role that the “new”
religious movements had previously filled. To avoid repeating
mistakes, we must consider the events of September 11 rationally by
(1) assessing the legal provisions that have been taken (or may be
taken) to reconcile the demands of national security and religious
liberty,15 and by (2) assessing the impact the events of September 11
will have on the long-term processes that shape the relationship
between religion and civil society throughout the West.16
Before starting this analysis, one point should be made clear.
Religious terrorism is not confined to Muslims; it concerns many
religions, including Christianity. In the West, however, the debate
on religion and security primarily focuses on Islam. Some people are
convinced that Islam is an inherently violent religion.17 I do not
share this opinion. The Qur’an does not contain more violent
passages than other sacred books, such as the Bible. During the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Islam was a peaceful religion.
Today, most Muslims do not support violence. Finally,
violence⎯both in the past and present⎯is common to the followers
of other religions. Thus, Islamic terrorism should be studied by
analyzing Islam’s historical roots, which can explain why some
Muslim groups justify their violent acts by claiming those acts are the
result of a religious obligation. The same approach can also help
explain non-Muslim religious terrorism. By understanding the
historical roots of religious violence, we may be able to remove the
social and cultural motivations for terrorism and break the link
between religion and violence.
a generalized diffidence toward all “new” religious movements still prevails and provides a
strong foundation for the enactment of severely restrictive provisions. See generally LAW AND
RELIGION IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE (Silvio Ferrari et al. eds., 2003). I make use of the
expression “new religious movements” because there is no better definition, although a
number of these movements are not new at all.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See William Pfaff, Stop Calling Islam the Enemy, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 5, 2002, at
6.
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This Article explores how modern, religiously motivated
terrorism⎯and in particular, the terrorist attack on the World Trade
Center in New York City on September 11, 2001⎯has affected the
delicate balance between individual religious liberty and national
security. In particular, this Article focuses on how new legislation
intended to protect national security after September 11 threatens
the religious liberty of nontraditional religions, most notably Islam,
in Europe. It argues that, while states must pass legislation to protect
national security, states can temper this new legislation to minimize
intrusions into religious liberty. Religious organizations themselves,
however, provide the best hope of spreading the message of
tolerance and reconciliation that will help ensure an individual’s right
to practice his or her religion in peace in whatever country he or she
resides.
This Article will begin its discussion of the relationship between
individual religious liberty and national security by first examining
religion and security after September 11. Part III then discusses legal
provisions affecting religion. Part IV examines the long-term impact
that the events of September 11 will have on church-state relations.
Part V contains a brief conclusion.
II. RELIGION AND SECURITY AFTER SEPTEMBER 11
Before September 11, 2001, lawmakers in some European states
were aware of the emerging link between religion and violence.
However, the terrorist attack on the twin towers of the World Trade
Center in New York City changed the balance between security and
liberty. Religion was identified as one of the forces behind that
attack. Consequently, post–September 11 enhanced security
measures have affected religious liberty. National security exigencies
as a result of the September 11 attack have restricted religious
freedom in at least three ways: (1) in a general way, in which
governments create new laws restricting fundamental rights; (2)
indirectly, in which governments scrutinize religious organizations;
and (3) directly, in which governments intrude into an
organization’s religious beliefs. These three new restrictions on
religious freedom are discussed below.

361

FER-FIN

7/3/2004 1:21 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Summer 2004

A. Government Creation of New Laws
Restricting Fundamental Rights
In response to September 11, many states have enacted, or are in
the process of enacting, laws restricting fundamental rights: freedom
of movement, freedom of association, and so on.18 These laws also
restrict religious liberty. For example, missionary activities in foreign
countries have become increasingly difficult because of more
stringent provisions regarding obtaining visas, transferring funds over
foreign borders, registering foreign organizations, and other related
conduct. The right to disseminate a religious belief⎯already under
attack in many countries19⎯has inevitably been affected.20
B. Government Scrutinization of Religious Organizations
Religious organizations are now scrutinized because some
terrorist groups use a religious cover to exploit the broad freedom
many states guarantee to religious organizations. State authorities no
longer refrain from examining the internal operation of an
organization simply because it has an alleged religious character;
state authorities want to be able to ascertain whether a religious
organization is endangering national security. United States Attorney
General John Ashcroft acknowledged this changed attitude toward

18. For information on the status of anti-terrorism laws in Australia, Canada, the United
States, France, India, Hong Kong, Japan, and the United Kingdom, see Bob Burton, Proposed
‘Anti-terrorism’ Law Flouts Rights, ASIA TIMES, Apr. 23, 2002, at http://www.atimes.com/
oceania/DD23Ah01.html; Margaret Ng, Hong Kong: Proposed Anti-terrorism Law:
Obstructing Rights Through Legislation, HUM. RTS. SOLIDARITY, May 2002, available at
http://www.ahrchk.net/hrsolid/mainfile.php/2002vol12no03/2221.htm;
World
Antiterrorism Laws, http://www.jurist.law.pitt.edu/terrorism/terrorism3a.htm (last visited Dec.
30, 2003).
19. Concerning the prohibition of proselytism, see SHARING THE BOOK: RELIGIOUS
PERSPECTIVES ON THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF PROSELYTISM (John Witte Jr. & Richard C.
Martin eds., 1999); Silvio Ferrari, Globalization, Postmodernism and Proselytism, 1999 FIDES
ET LIBERTAS 13; Tad Stahnke, Proselytism and the Freedom to Change Religion in International
Human Rights Law, 1999 BYU L. REV. 251, 267 (discussing discrimination in restrictions on
proselytizing).
20. The impact of the September 11 events on religious liberty is not limited to
missionary activities but extends to many other areas. For example, the rise of the insurance
costs of religious buildings could consume critical funds and reduce the scope of religious
activities. See Rachel Pomerance, United States: Jewish Groups Feeling the Pinch After Post-9/11
Hikes in Insurance (Aug. 14, 2002), at http://www.religioscope.com/articles/2002/
015_insurance.htm.
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religious organizations,21 and a few provisions embodying this new
attitude have been enacted in the United States22 and other nations.
More state control over the inner life and organization of religious
communities is therefore to be expected.
C. Government Intrusion into Religious Beliefs
Post–September 11 legal provisions that enhance national
security threaten to intrude into religious beliefs. There is a need to
prevent people from considering that violence can be religiously
justified and to break the bond uniting religion and violence once
that bond has been established.23 However, the state’s need to
separate religion and violence also endangers religious belief and
doctrine. If a religious doctrine advocates the subversion of the state,
is tainted with intolerance, and opposes the democratic fundamentals
of civil society, can state authorities require it to be changed and
enforce this change? Can state authorities outlaw the religious group
that upholds a subversive doctrine, although no crime has been
committed? Political parties have been banned on this ground.24 The
question is whether the same attitude applies to religious
organizations.

21. See Associated Press, Ashcroft: We’ll Watch Religious Groups, (Dec. 2, 2001),
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,39924,00.html.
If a religion is hijacked and used as a cover for killing thousands of Americans, we’re
interested in that . . . . We will respect the rights of political freedom and religious
freedom, and we are deeply committed to that. But for so-called terrorists to gather
over themselves some robe of clericism . . . and claim immunity from being
observed, people who hijack a religion and make out of it an implement of war will
not be free from our interest.
Id. (statement by John Ashcroft).
22. The new FBI guidelines widen an agent’s power to monitor religious institutions.
See Susan Schmidt & Dan Eggen, FBI Given More Latitude: New Surveillance Rules Remove
Evidence Hurdle, WASH. POST, May 30, 2002, at A01.
23. It is undeniable that religion can motivate terrorist acts and that violence is an
integral part of many sacred texts. It is a fact that a number of terrorists regard what they do as
fulfilling God’s will. We are right, however, to consider the behavior of such people as a
perversion of religion and to deem such people misled by bad teachers, but we must
nonetheless acknowledge that many of these terrorists believe they are acting in good faith.
24. For a recent example, see the European Court of Human Rights’ decision in the
case of Refah Partisi [The Welfare Party] v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 (2003), available at
http://www.echr.coe.int.
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III. LEGAL PROVISIONS AFFECTING RELIGION
Immediately following⎯and, in some cases, prior to⎯September
11, 2001, a few European states approved laws enhancing national
security. Some of these laws dealt explicitly with religion. Examining
these legal provisions provides important insight into the new
balance between religious liberty and national security.
A. U.K. Terrorism Act 2000: Fighting Religious Terrorism
The most important European legal provision affecting religion
is the U.K. Terrorism Act 2000 (“the Act”), which proscribes
terrorist groups.
The Act defines terrorism as “the use or threat of action . . .
designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or
a section of the public . . . and . . . made for the purpose of
advancing a political, religious, or ideological cause.”25 An action falls
within the scope of the Act if it
(a) involves serious violence against a person, (b) involves serious
damage to property, (c) endangers a person’s life, other than that
of the person committing the action, (d) creates a serious risk to
the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or (e) is
designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an
electronic system.26

Listing religion as a motivation for terrorism was uncommon in
previous European antiterrorism legal provisions, although a
reference to “religious fanaticism” as a motivation for terrorism
appeared in the 1997 E.U. Resolution on Combating Terrorism in
the European Union.27 Following the example of the U.N.

25. Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 1(1) (Eng.) (emphasis added).
26. Id. § 1(2).
27. See Nicola Vennemann, Country Report on the European Union, in TERRORISM AS A
CHALLENGE FOR NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, pt. III, § 1 (Christian Walter et al.
eds., 2003) [hereinafter TERRORISM AS A CHALLENGE] (proceedings of the conference
organized by the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law,
Heidelberg, Jan. 24−25, 2003). For the text of the resolution entitled Combating Terrorism in
the European Union, which was adopted January 30, 1997, see http://www3.europarl.
eu.int/omk/omnsapir.so/calendar?APP=PDF&TYPE=PV2&FILE=19970130EN.pdf&LAN
GUE=EN (last visited Mar. 10, 2004). The same reference to religious fanaticism is included
in the Recommendation on the role of the European Union in combating terrorism adopted
by the European Parliament on September 5, 2001. See the above URL address for the text.
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Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism,28
terrorism was usually defined in connection with “political
purposes,” and religion was only mentioned as a force that could
never justify terrorism. However, the new, modified definition of
terrorism in the U.K. Terrorism Act, which identifies religion as a
possible motivation for terrorism and which is followed by laws
approved in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand,29 means the
lawmaker knows that terrorism can be inspired by religion and he
will no longer grant religious organizations a presumption of
innocence.30
The U.K. Terrorism Act is a complex piece of legislation and
requires a more extensive examination than it is possible to provide
in this Article. This Article is limited to two observations: the Act’s

28. G.A. Res. 60, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., 84th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/60
(1994), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/49/a49r060.htm. Section I,
paragraph 3 of the Declaration states that
Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general
public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any
circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical,
ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to
justify them.
The Declaration was approved with U.N. General Assembly Resolution A/RES/49/60
on December 9, 1994. See also the definition of terrorism in Measures to Eliminate
International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 210, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., 88th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/51/210 (1996), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/51/
a51r210.htm.
For an extensive discussion on the definition of terrorism, see NATHAN HANCOCK,
TERRORISM AND THE LAW IN AUSTRALIA: LEGISLATION, COMMENTARY AND CONSTRAINTS
(Parl. of Austl., Research Paper No. 12, 2001–2002), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/
library/pubs/rp/2001-02/02rp12.htm; NATHAN HANCOCK, TERRORISM AND THE LAW IN
AUSTRALIA: SUPPORTING MATERIALS (Parl. of Austl., Research Paper No. 13, 2001–2002),
available at www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp/2001-02/02rp13.htm.
29. See the definition of terrorist activities in Criminal Code Act, 1995, § 100.1
(Austl.), as modified by Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill, 2002 (Austl.);
CRIMINAL CODE, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 83.01(1)(b) (1985) (Can.), as modified by Antiterrorism Act, ch. 41 (2001) (Can.), http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/A-11.7/1860.html. For an
analysis of this act, see Markus Wagner, Country Report on Canada, in TERRORISM AS A
CHALLENGE, supra note 27, at 1; Terrorism Suppression Act, No. 34, pt. 1, § 5 (2002)
(N.Z.). For an analysis of this law, see JOHN E. SMITH, NEW ZEALAND’S ANTI-TERRORISM
CAMPAIGN: BALANCING CIVIL LIBERTIES, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSIBILITIES (2003), available at http://www.fulbright.org.nz/voices/axford/docs/
smithj.pdf.
30. The previous definition of terrorism did not mention religion. See Prevention of
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, c. 4, § 20(1) (Eng.).
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definition of terrorism and the power it grants to proscribe religious
organizations.
1. The Act’s definition of terrorism is too broad
The Act’s definition of terrorism is very broad31 and invites
dangerously broad interpretations. This is best illustrated by an
example. Let us imagine that, at the time of the Salman Rushdie
affair, Muslims opposing the protection granted Rushdie by the
government of the United Kingdom disrupted the electronic mail
system of a government office by sending a large number of
protesting e-mails. Today this action could be considered a terrorist
act. We can therefore agree with those people who fear that the law
will criminalize expressions of dissent and who request inclusion of
some clauses, along the lines of those appearing in the Canadian Bill,
to prevent this risk.32
In spite of its broad definition of terrorism, the U.K. Terrorism
Act is founded on a sound principle: resorting to violence to advance
a religious cause is never legitimate. This is a minimal statement, but
it identifies the border dividing what is acceptable and what is not, it
applies to believers of any religion, and it creates a platform on which
it is possible to build a large consensus.
2. The Act gives a government the discretionary power to proscribe
terrorist organizations
The second observation about the U.K. Terrorism Act regards
the British Secretary of State’s discretionary power to proscribe a
terrorist organization. According to the Act, once he is convinced an
organization is involved in terrorism, the Secretary of State may by
order proscribe it without a court decision.33 Although it is difficult
31. However, they are not as broad as those contained in the U.S. Homeland Security
Act of 2002, approved on January 23, 2002. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-296, § 2(15), 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
32. The Canadian Act, see supra note 29, explicitly exempts from the definition of
terrorism those acts that cause “serious interference with or serious disruption of an essential
service, facility or system” but are “a result of advocacy, protest, dissent or stoppage of work
that is not intended” to endanger the life, health, or safety of persons. See CRIMINAL CODE,
R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 83.01(1)(b)(ii)(E) (1985) (Can.).
33. Terrorism Act, 2000, § 3(4) (Eng.). According to the Act, “an organisation is
concerned in terrorism if it (a) commits or participates in acts of terrorism, (b) prepares for
terrorism, (c) promotes or encourages terrorism, or (d) is otherwise concerned in terrorism.”
Id. § 3(5).
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to object to action against terrorist organizations, we must
remember that proscribing a religious organization involved in
terrorist activity can interfere with the free practice of that religion by
its guiltless members. Consider the case where the proscribed
organization “is the sole organisation legitimised within the religious
system” and cannot be replaced by another.34 In this case, it is
reasonable to require that “organisations that are the sole vehicles of
a particular belief system should be subject to especial scrutiny before
proscription is permitted.”35
B. Banning Extremist Religions in Russia and Germany
Russia has focused on ways to combat religious extremism. The
2002 federal law On Counteracting Extremist Activity36 forbids “the
founding and activity of [a] public organisation[] whose goals or
actions are aimed at carrying out extremist” activities.37 The statute
defines the following activities as extremist activities: (1) inciting
religious enmity and propagandizing exclusivity, and (2) superiority
or inferiority of citizens on account of their attitude towards
religion.38 Article 15 of the Russian law establishes that an extremist
statement made in public by a leader of an organization that is not
denounced by the organization, as well as the conviction of one of
its leaders for extremist activities, may be evidence of extremism in
the entire organization.39 Article 15 further adds that extremist
activity carried out by a subdivision of an organization exposes the
entire organization to prosecution.40
Extremist religious associations have also been banned in
Germany. In December 2001, the law on associations was amended
and the religions privilege⎯that is, the prohibition on banning
34. PETER EDGE, LEGAL RESPONSES TO RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCE 120−21 (2002).
35. Id.
36. On Counteracting Extremist Activity, Fed. Law No. 114-FZ (July 25, 2002), Sobr.
Zakonod. RF, 2002, No. 30, Item 3031. For a general overview of this law, see J. Brian Gross,
Comment, Russia’s War on Political and Religious Extremism, 2003 BYU L. REV. 717.
37. See Togran B. Beknazar, Country Report on Russia, pt. III § 7.a, in TERRORISM AS A
CHALLENGE, supra note 27, at 16 (citing art. 9 of the law).
38. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 36, at 728 (noting that the Russian law prohibits
organizations from propagandizing exclusion or advocating supremacy or inferiority based on
factors such as religion or race).
39. E.g., id. at 725 (providing an overview of a provision in Article 15 of the Russian
law).
40. See Beknazar, supra note 37, at 18.
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religious associations⎯was abolished.41 As a consequence, the
German government can now ban religious associations whose
objectives or activities conflict with the criminal laws or that oppose
the constitutional order or the concept of international
understanding. In fact, a few days after this legislative change, the
German government banned an association called the Kalifstaat on
the grounds of internal state security.
Although the significance of the new German provision is largely
symbolic,42 it conveys a clear message: the lawmaker regards religious
extremism as the first step toward religious terrorism and will no
longer grant immunity to extremist religious doctrines.
These provisions illustrate the growing tendency to punish an
entire organization for the crimes committed by some of its
members, and they also repeat a pattern that can be found in many
antiterrorism laws.43 These provisions inevitably extend to innocent
people the prosecution and repression that should be reserved for the
crimes of some extremists.
Fighting religious extremism is not the same as fighting religious
terrorism. While the latter consists of actions and facts, religious
extremism focuses on ideas and teachings. These ideas may be
dangerous ones that could help develop terrorism, but when we are
in the realm of ideas (and not of facts) a more careful and restrained
approach is required.
C. Statutes Repressing Religious Hatred
Not only have states taken steps to prevent religious terrorism,
but they have also legislated against religious conflict. State officials

41. See Erstes Gesetz zur Änderung des Vereinsgesetzes [Amendment to the Law of
Associations] v. 12.4.2001 (BGBl. I S.3319). About this law, see Kathrin Groh, Das
Religionsprivileg des Vereinsgesetzes, 85 KRITISCHE VIERTELJAHRESSCHRIFT FÜR
GESETZGEBUNG UND RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 39 (2002); Ralf Poscher, Vereinsverbote gegen
Religionsgemeinschaften?, 85 KRITISCHE VIERTELJAHRESSCHRIFT FÜR GESETZGEBUNG UND
RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 298 (2002); Markus Rau, Country Report on Germany, pt. III § 1, in
TERRORISM AS A CHALLENGE, supra note 27, at 1.
42. Before the new German law was passed, it was possible to ban religious associations
performing activities in conflict with criminal law or the constitutional order.
43. See the remarks devoted to the U.K. Terrorism Act of 2000, supra Part III.A. But
the trend is not confined to antiterrorism laws. Another example is the antisects law recently
approved in France. Law No. 2001-504 of June 12, 2001, J.O., June 13, 2001, p. 9337. The
law makes possible the dissolution of a sectarian association when its leaders have been
condemned for violation of the criminal legislation.
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in charge of national security increasingly focus on interreligious
confrontations and conflicts, because these disputes degenerate into
violence more frequently than they had in the past. Preventing
religious strife is considered an effective way of enhancing security.
For this reason, many states now pay more attention to their
obligations under Article 20(2) of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)44 and have enacted new laws that
repress religious hatred. For example, the United Kingdom Antiterrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001 extends the provisions
concerning incitement of racial hatred to also include religious
hatred.45
There is some criticism of these new provisions.46 Similar laws
have been approved in other Western European states47 and their
enforcement has not created particular problems. However, events
that have occurred elsewhere, especially in the central Asian
countries, indicate that enforcing religious tolerance through state
laws can be dangerous. It is not difficult for us to imagine a
malevolent state official picking an appropriate passage of the Bible
or the Qur’an and then construing it as condoning religious strife or
violence.
Religious organizations could repress religious hatred more
effectively than the states. Religious organizations could develop
codes of religious harmony48 or common guidelines that are then
44. “Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to
discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.” International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at
52, art. 20(2), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
45. Moreover, the Act extends the racially aggravated offenses of assault, public order,
criminal damage, and harassment to cover attacks aggravated by religious hostility. See 2 OPEN
SOCIETY INSTITUTE, The Situation of Muslims in the UK, in MONITORING THE EU
ACCESSION PROCESS: MINORITY PROTECTION 406−09 (2002).
46. See Ralph Smyth, The Real State of Emergency: Is the UK About to be Turned into a
Police State?, pt. 5 (Nov. 22, 2001), at http://www.urban75.com/Action/terror2001.html.
47. For an example in Italy, see Misure urgenti in materia di discriminazione razziale,
etnica e religiosa, Gazz. Uff., June 26, 1993, n.205, Le Leggi 205/1993, June 25, 1993
(Italy). For an example in Spain, see Ley Organica 8/1983 (B.O.E., 1983, 152), arts. 137,
165 (Spain). For an example in Portugal, see CRIMINAL CODE art. 240 (Port.).
48. For an example, see the religious harmony declaration prepared by the religious
authorities of Singapore, following an invitation by the Singapore Prime Minister. For the text
and some comments, see DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS HARMONY, at http://www.seuteck.
org/religiousharmonyenglish.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2003); Declaration of Religious
Harmony Becomes Part of Singapore Life, RADIO SING. INT’L NEWSLINE (June 10, 2003), at
http://archive.rsi.com.sg/en/programmes/newsline/2003/06/10_06_01.htm;
Religious
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applied to controversial issues.49 Currently, too few of these codes
and guidelines exist, and they are not always effective. But fighting
religious hatred is primarily the responsibility of religious
communities. If religious organizations are unwilling or unable to
fight religious hatred, states take the problem into their own hands,
although the states’ approach inevitably focuses on political rather
than religious interests,50 which could result in further repression of
religion.51
D. Construing National Security as a
Legitimate Limitation to Religious Liberty
National security is not identified as a legitimate limitation to
religious practice in the international covenants,52 nor is it identified
as a limitation in most European constitutions.53 However, because
of the increase in religiously motivated terrorism, we can expect

Harmony Declaration Calls for Greater Social Cohesion Among Singaporeans (June 11, 2003),
at http://www.hrwf.net/html/singapore_2003.html.
49. Proselytism is an example of this. See the guiding principles listed in Bert Beach,
Proselytism in the Context of Globalization, Religious Liberty and Non-Discrimination, 2001
FIDES ET LIBERTAS 85, 85−87.
50. The definition of “religion” and “religious” is of crucial importance in deciding
whether a group is entitled to protection. The state would have the power to refuse protection
to a group by denying its religious character. The topic has been raised, with reference to
Scientology, in connection with the United Kingdom Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act
of 2001. See BRIEFING ON THE ANTI-TERRORISM CRIME AND SECURITY BILL, HOUSE OF
LORDS SECOND READING 13−16 (Nov. 2001), available at http://www.justice.org.uk/
images/pdfs/anti-terrorismbill.pdf.
51. An example of these dangers is the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act enacted
in Singapore in 1990, ch. 167A, available at http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/non_version/html/
homepage.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2003). In order to protect religious harmony, the Act
gives the state authorities the power to issue a restraining order against any religious
representative who excites “disaffection against the President or the Government while, or
under the guise of, propagating or practising any religious belief.” Id. art. 8(1)(d). The order
can restrain the religious representative from addressing a congregation or publishing any text
without the prior permission of the state authorities. Id. art. 8(2).
52. See ICCPR, supra note 44, art. 18(3); European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 9(2), E.T.S. 5, 213 U.N.T.S.
222 [hereinafter ECHR]. The Human Rights Committee of the United Nations explicitly
excluded invoking national security as a legitimate limit to Article 18. See U.N. Human Rights
Comm., Gen. Comment No. 22(48) ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 (1993).
53. Poland is the only member state of the European Union to list national security
among the limitations to religious freedom. POL. CONST. art. 53.
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political pressure on states to include national security among the
legitimate limitations to religious practice.54
To assess the impact of national security as a limitation on
religious liberty, we must consider the meaning, scope, and aim of
the national security clause of the ICCPR.55 According to the
Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in
the ICCPR, “[n]ational security may be invoked to justify measures
limiting certain rights only when they are taken to protect the
existence of the nation, its territorial integrity or political
independence against force or threat of force.”56
Until now, international court case law on national security has
dealt only with secular matters,57 but some issues certainly have a
religious profile. For example, imagine that a religious authority,
basing his statements on the sacred books of his religion, asks part of
the population of a country to secede because that population is not
entitled to live according to its religious law, or urges soldiers
professing a particular religion to desert so they are not obliged to
fight against soldiers belonging to the same religion but residing in a
54. The new Bulgarian law on religions, approved on December 20, 2002, already lists
national security among the limitations of religious freedom. See Law on Religions, art. 7
(2002) (Bulg.).
55. See ICCPR, supra note 44, arts. 19(2), (3b) (regarding freedom of expression);
ECHR, supra note 52, art. 10(2) (regarding freedom of expression); see also ECHR, supra
note 52, art. 11(2) (regarding freedom of assembly and association); ICCPR, supra note 44,
arts. 21, 22(2) (regarding freedom of assembly and association).
56. U.N. ESCOR Comm’n on Human Rights, 41st Sess., Annex ¶ 29, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1985/4 (1985), available at http://www.article23.org.hk/english/research/
ICCPR.doc. The Siracusa definition of national security is specified in the Johannesburg
Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information. According
to principle 2(a),
[a] restriction sought to be justified on the ground of national security is not
legitimate unless its genuine purpose and demonstrable effect is to protect a
country’s existence or its territorial integrity against the use or threat of force, or its
capacity to respond to the use or threat of force, whether from an external source,
such as a military threat, or an internal source, such as incitement to violent
overthrow of the government.
Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to
Information 2(a), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/39 (1995) [hereinafter Johannesburg Princs.],
available at http://www.article19.org.docimages/511.htm.
57. Secular matters regarding security have involved disclosure of classified secrets,
prohibition of reporting interviews with representatives of proscribed political organizations,
banning of associations because of their totalitarian program, and so on. See MARK W. JANIS ET
AL., EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 185−89 (2000); JACQUES VELU & RUSEN ERGEC, LA
CONVENTION EUROPÉENNE DES DROIT DE L’HOMME, BRUXELLES, BRUYLANT 618−19,
657−59 (1990).
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different state, or demands that a “holy” war be waged against
another state. These examples illustrate how national security can be
affected by religion, and they illustrate how any attempt to curb such
actions on the part of a religious leader could interfere with religious
freedom.
Articles 18(3) of the ICCPR and 9(2) of the ECHR may already
provide some grounds for restricting these manifestations of
religion,58 but they do not address this hypothetical, religiously
motivated behavior, which clearly endangers national security. As
episodes of this kind become more frequent, it would not be
unreasonable to include national security among the limitations on
religious liberty, provided the limitation is framed in a way that
minimizes the risk of unjustly restricting the right to practice
religion. However, in many countries where religious liberty is
limited in the name of national security⎯for example,
Uzbekistan59⎯this limitation on religious liberty has been exploited
to establish regimes where legitimate and peaceful religious
communities have been denied religious liberty.60
While the usual safeguards ensuring the legitimacy of laws
limiting religion must be met⎯that is, any restriction should be
prescribed by law, aimed at protecting a legitimate national security
interest, and necessary in a democratic society⎯the main guarantee
that national security is not abused resides in establishing a definite
link between repressible manifestations of religion and violence:61
58. On the point whether the examples made in the previous paragraph can be regarded
as manifestations of religion, see MALCOLM D. EVANS, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EUROPE 304−14 (1997).
59. See Grant Garrard Beckwith, Uzbekistan: Islam, Communism, and Religious Liberty,
2000 BYU L. REV. 997, 997−1039. Article 3 of this law states that “[t]he freedom of worship
or any other conviction are [sic] subject only to the restrictions necessary to ensure national
security and public order, and life, health, morals, rights and freedoms of other citizens.” Id. at
1040–41. Article 5 further expounds on this issue by declaring “[t]he use of religion for antistate and anti-constitutional propaganda, and to incite hostility, hatred, inter-ethnic discord, to
undermine ethical norms and civil accord, to spread libelous, and destabilizing ideas, to create
panic among the people and for other actions against the state, society and individual is
inadmissible.” Id. at 1042. Such vaguely worded and dangerously general legal provisions are
not restricted to Uzbekistan but are common to other central Asian states.
60. See UN News, Anti-terrorism Used as an Excuse to Clamp Down on Religion – UN
Report (Sept. 29, 2003), http://www.hrwf.net/html/un_2003.html (stating that the attacks
of September 11 have become “an excuse for a crackdown on religion”).
61. For more information, see Lee Boothby, International Law Principles Applied to
National Security and Religious Expression: A Report, Some Observations and Suggestions, 2003
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manifestations of religion may be repressed only if they are intended
to and are likely to incite imminent violence.62 This guarantee should
list a number of religious manifestations that are explicitly protected
and that cannot be restricted on grounds of national security.
Examples of religious manifestations that should be listed as
protected include any manifestation that (a) “constitutes objection,
or advocacy of objection, on grounds of religion, conscience or
belief, to military conscription or service, a particular conflict, or the
threat or use of force to settle international disputes”;63 (b) “is
directed at communicat[ing] information about alleged violations of
international human rights standards or international humanitarian
law”;64 (c) “advocates non-violent change of government policy or
the government itself”; or (d) “constitutes criticism of, or insult to,
the nation, the state or its symbols, the government, its agencies, or
public officials . . . or a foreign nation, state or its symbols,
government, agencies or public officials, unless the criticism or insult
was intended and likely to incite imminent violence.”65 A provision
including these limits might satisfy the need for more national
security and minimize the restriction of religious freedom.
If national security is further threatened⎯as a consequence of a
war, for example⎯then other more radical measures may be taken.
Depending on the situation, such measures might include stricter
control over places of worship66 and foreign religious personnel;67
FIDES ET LIBERTAS 36. Boothby explores the possibility of applying the Johannesburg
Principles to religious expressions and manifestations.
62. The formulation proposed by Boothby is
Religious manifestation may be punished as a threat to national security only if a
government can demonstrate that:
(1) The manifestation is intended to incite imminent violence;
(2) It is likely to incite such violence; and
(3) There is a direct and immediate connection between the religious manifestation
and the likelihood or occurrence of such violence.
Id. at 40.
63. See id.
64. Id.
65. See Johannesburg Princs., supra note 56, at princs. 7(a)(i), 7(a)(ii), 7(b); Boothby,
supra note 61, at 38 (paraphrasing the Johannesburg Principles in the context of religious
manifestation).
66. Places of worship enjoy a particularly strong protection in the legal systems of many
European states. In Italy, for example, police cannot enter a church unless a crime is being
committed. See Legge 25 marzo 1985, n.121, Ratifica ed esecuzione dell’Accordo, con
protocollo addizionale, firmato a Roma il 18 febbraio 1984, che apporta modificazioni al
Concordato lateranense dell’11 febbraio 1929, tra la Repubblica Italiana e la S. Sede (Law of
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exceptions to the respect of religious privacy,68 including the
religious secret;69 and tightening the registration procedure of
religious organizations, particularly those that have their
headquarters abroad. In the worst cases, even the right to change
religion could be affected.70
March 25, 1985), art. 5, in Supplemento ordinario alla Gazz. Uff., April 10, 1985. In any
other case, the religious authority in charge of the church must be notified in advance. After
September 11, these restrictions on police control of places of worship (and particularly
mosques) might easily be lifted. Recently the military advisor of the Italian Prime Minister has
suggested closing down the mosques where Muslim religious authorities incite religious hate.
See Sarzanini Fiorenza, Meno diritti per combattere il terrorismo, IL CORRIERE DELLA SERA,
Dec. 4, 2003, at 5. For a non-European example, see Emad Mekay, 88,000 Mosques, One
Sermon
(July
28,
2003),
at
http://www.hrwf.net/html/egypt_2003.html#
mosquesonesermon (describing state censorship of sermons delivered in Egyptian mosques).
67. In the Netherlands, for example, new imams are required to attend compulsory
classes where they are given courses on topics like freedom of speech and religion, nondiscrimination, women’s rights, homosexuality, and so on. If they refuse, they will not get a
residence permit. See Andrew Osborn, Muslims Told to Speak Dutch in Mosques (Oct. 2, 2002),
at http://www.hrwf.net/html/netherlands2002.htm.
68. In consideration of the increasingly significant link between terrorism and religion,
knowing the religious affiliation of a person, particularly if he or she is an immigrant, could be
considered a legitimate interest of security officers. A proposal in this sense was made by the
Ministry of Interior of the German Land of Bavaria: immigrants should declare their religion
when they enter a country and this information should be fed into a central database. See the
interview given to Lindner Claudio, Beckstein, lo “sceriffo” della Baviera: “Copierò le norme
italiane sulle impronte,” IL CORRIERE DELLA SERA, Sept. 21, 2002.
69. The protection traditionally enjoyed by the attorney-client relationship was one of
the first casualties of the post−September 11 regulations enacted in the United States. See
David W. Hendon & Lee Canipe, Notes on Church-State Affairs, 44 J. CHURCH & ST. 383,
395−96 (2002). The erosion of the right to privacy could also affect the confidentiality of the
religious minister-member relationship. This confidentiality is strongly protected by the laws of
many European states. See, e.g., James Casey, State and Church in Ireland, in STATE AND
CHURCH IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 147, 165 (Gerhard Robbers ed., 1996); Richard Potz,
State and Church in Austria, in STATE AND CHURCH IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra, at
229, 254; Gerhard Robbers, State and Church in Germany, in STATE AND CHURCH IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION, supra, at 57, 71. Similar provisions are in force in Italy, Spain, Portugal,
etc., but the confidentiality of the minister-member relationship was recently weakened by
some court decisions (notably in France) connected to cases of pedophilia involving religious
ministers. See Olivier Echappé, Le secret en question, in XLIII L’ANNÉE CANONIQUE 285−300
(2001) (regarding the Court of Caen decision of September 2, 2001). The issue of pedophilia
was perceived as so sensitive that the religious or professional secret was not regarded as a
sufficient exemption from the obligation to report a crime. A similar result could occur when
equally sensitive issues⎯security, for example⎯are at stake.
70. Recently, the most important Italian newspaper gave prominence to an article
stressing that conversions to Islam frequently contain “an implicit or explicit refusal of the
liberal civilization of the West.” Angelo Panebianco, I crociati al contrario [It Crosses You to the
Contrary], IL CORRIERE DELLA SERA, Aug. 19, 2002, at 71 (author’s translation). Therefore,
these conversions cannot be considered exclusively in a religious perspective, as they have
relevant political implications. The article does not draw the conclusions that logically descend
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Enacting laws such as these would shift the balance between
religious liberty and national security and would affect church-state
relations even more deeply than the limited measures that have been
taken. Yet, as significant as the effect of September 11 has been on
new legislation, the events of September 11 affect the balance
between religious liberty and national security at another, more
indirect but more extensive level. Part IV explores this topic.
IV. LONG-TERM IMPACT ON CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS
The effects of the events of September 11 will extend beyond
enacting the new legal provisions this Article examined in Part III.
The new balance between security and freedom will affect basic
principles that define the place religion has had in European society.
It is unlikely that the September 11 events will be strong enough to
significantly change the fundamental features of the European system
of church-state relations, but they may provide an impetus to already
ongoing processes that particularly concern the separation of church
and state and the notion of traditional religion.
A. Lowering the Wall of Separation Between Church and State
In Europe, the wall of separation between church and state
began lowering many years ago, but the need for greater national
security may accelerate this trend.
Separation of church and state is based on the idea that the state
is not competent to intervene in religious matters. Terrorist groups’
recourse to religion will make people question the idea that the state
is not competent to intervene in religious affairs. Religions are no
longer “beyond the cognizance” of civil government, as James
Madison once said.71 The civil government has a legitimate interest
from this statement, but this line of reasoning paves the way to the introduction of some
limitations to the freedom of conversion on the model of the laws already existing in some
Middle East and Asian countries. On this topic, see supra note 19. For some recent
developments in this field, see Gujarat to Ban Faith Conversion (Feb. 25, 2003), at
http://www.hrwf.net/html/india_2003.html#GujaraHoban; see also Joshua Newton, India
Prepares National “Anti-conversion Rule,” (Sep. 15, 2003), at http://www.hrwf.net/
html/india_2003.html#Indiapreparesnationalanticonversion.
71. Derek H. Davis, Editorial: The Dark Side to a Just War: The USA PATRIOT Act
and Counterterrorism’s Potential Threat to Religious Freedom, 44 J. CHURCH & ST. 5 (2002).
Davis adds that “[t]he PATRIOT Act . . . could have the harmful result of striking down the
veil that has obscured religious belief and, to a lesser extent, religious practice from the
cognizance of governmental authority.” Id. at 8.
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in what religions affirm and practice.72 More importantly, the state
may intervene to prevent religions from being turned into
instruments of violence. Religions have lost their innocence:73 they
no longer live in a Garden of Eden. They need to prove they can
benefit civil society or at least prove they are harmless.
Lowering the wall separating church and state will affect majority
and minority religions in Europe in different ways. Minority
religions,74 particularly those whose tenets question the secular
character of the state, the respect of its symbols, and so on, can
expect an increase in state control and in interference with their
practice and possibly their belief.75 As a result of September 11, Islam
will be scrutinized most heavily by the state, but other minority
religious groups may also be affected. Governments may be tempted
to exploit the national security issue in order to control not only
violent and dangerous religious groups, but also “unpopular”
religious communities, that is, groups that believe and behave in a
way that is inconsistent with the principles and practices of the
majority of citizens. If this attitude prevails, security concerns will
legitimize the increasing mistrust of some religious minorities in
Europe, both in the West (laws regarding “new” religious
movements are a good example of this) and in the East (for example,

72. See Robert A. Seiple, Religious Liberty on the Global Stage, Address Delivered at
the Spirit of Liberty Symposium (Nov. 13, 2001), available at http://www.
globalengagement.org/issues/2001/11/rseiple-philly.htm (“[W]e need to know our enemy.
Our enemy claims to be working from a religious base. We need to know the values of that
enemy in order to defeat him, to understand his motivation for what he has done and, most
importantly, what he might be planning to do next.”).
73. The lost innocence of religions is not something absolutely new. The Aum
Shinrikyo gas attack on the Tokyo subway or the mass suicide of the Solar Temple followers,
and so on, had alerted public opinion to the existence of dangerous or destructive sects.
However, these events involved small and borderline groups (the term “sect” found in popular
language concerning these groups shows they were not regarded as “true” religions). What is
new about the September 11 events is that they involved Islam, the second largest religion in
the world. On the difference between the violence coming from groups that are or are not part
of a historical tradition, see Jean-François Mayer, Violence et nouveaux mouvements religieux:
quelles leçons pouvons-nous tirer? (Aug. 22, 2002), at http://www.terrorisme.net/
analyse/2002/005_nrm.htm.
74. It is not easy to identify “minority religions” because each religion is a minority
religion somewhere in Europe. What makes the difference is that some religions (such as Islam,
Judaism, and the so-called “new” religious movements) are minority religions practically
everywhere; other religions (Roman Catholicism or Russian Orthodoxy, for instance) are
minority religions in some countries but are the majority religion in others.
75. On the forms this control could assume, see supra Part III.
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the treatment of non-Orthodox religions in Russia). Models for
more restrictive legislation may be provided either by the French law
on “sects”76 or by the legal provisions in some post-Communist
European countries.77 The second option is more likely to occur, due
to the enlargement of the European Union by adding a number of
these countries in 2004. Thus harmonizing different legal systems
may strike a balance between Western and Eastern European
standards on religious liberty and equal treatment of religious
groups, raising the Eastern standards but lowering the Western
ones.78 But whichever option prevails, this process of using national
security concerns to control religious groups may abuse national
security, using it to stop religious practices that have little to do with
religiously motivated violence.
Ensuring separation of church and state is more complicated
when we consider majority religions. In Europe, the fear of terrorism
joins up with the fear of immigration, and particularly of Muslim
immigration. The growing presence of immigrants from Asia and
Africa has spread the conviction that Europe is on the point of losing
its identity, of being transformed into a multicultural continent
without a soul. An increasing number of people think that security
cannot be effectively granted without social cohesion and a strong
collective identity. Christian churches, as a central part of the
European identity, will be called on more and more to help preserve
the European cultural heritage and to provide the principles and
values for building some kind of European “civil religion”⎯that is, a
set of values shared by a large segment of Europeans and that unites
believers and nonbelievers, Catholics as well as Protestants and
Orthodox, and so on.79

76. Law No. 2001-504 of June 12, 2001, J.O., June 13, 2001, p. 9337.
77. See generally LAW AND RELIGION IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE, supra note 14.
78. At a much deeper level, the problem the European Union will have to face is
striking a balance between the conception of religious liberty prevailing in the Orthodox
Church on the one hand and in the Catholic and Protestant churches on the other. According
to Grace Davie and other scholars, this difference is only the emerging part of a much larger
division that is deeply rooted in history. See GRACE DAVIE, RELIGION IN MODERN EUROPE: A
MEMORY MUTATES 3−4 (2000); see also Lawrence Uzzell, Russians and Catholics, FIRST
THINGS, Oct. 2002, at 21 (examining religious divisions in Russia).
79. See DAVIE, supra note 78, at 193−94. Davie stresses that the European Union
cannot progress from a merely economic to a complex sociopolitical entity without some kind
of European civil religion taking shape.
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It is dangerous to associate Christianity with the European
heritage. One may wonder how non-Christian religions⎯and
particularly Islam⎯can help shape the European civil religion.
Muslims’ contribution will likely be marginal at the beginning. This
might exacerbate the Muslims’ feeling of exclusion, raising precisely
the security problems that should be avoided. Thus, civil religion
may be either truly inclusive and play a cohesive role or divisive and
create new divisions.
Let us take the issue of the crucifix in classrooms as an example
of the potential problems associated with a civil religion.80
Supporting the presence of the crucifix in classrooms as a symbol of
European identity and culture could easily convey the idea that nonChristians are not fully part of European history and tradition and
have no place in today’s Europe. The issue would separate not only
the faithful of different religions but also citizens, separating those
who are “real” Europeans from those who, their opponents would
contend, do not share the European soul. Such a division would
make it more difficult to conceive of the European Union as a
common house where everybody can feel at home irrespective of his
or her religious convictions.
These same remarks regarding placement of the crucifix in
classrooms could be repeated regarding the proposal to mention the
Christian roots of Europe in the future constitution of the European
Union.81

80. The question of the crucifix in the classrooms was discussed in Switzerland. See
Vincenzo Pacillo, Decisioni elvetiche in tema di crocifisso e velo islamico nella scuola pubblica:
spunti di comparazione, 110 IL DIRITTO ECCLESIASTICO 210−29 (1999). The question of the
crucifix in the classroom was also discussed in Germany after the decision of the Constitutional
Court of May 16, 1995. See Joseph Listl, The Development of Civil Ecclesiastical Law in the
Federal Republic of Germany, 1995/1996, 3 EUR. J. FOR CHURCH & ST. RES. 11, 13−14
(1996); see also Jörg Müller-Vollbehr, Positive und Negative Religionsfreiheit, 20
JURISTENZEITUNG 996 (1995). And now it is debated in Italy. See ANDREA GUAZZAROTTI,
GIUDICI E MINORANZE RELIGIOSE 237−41 (2001).
81. See, e.g., Pope John Paul II, supra note 10; see also Constant Brand, EU
Constitutional Convention Divided over Powers, Religion (Jan. 22, 2003), at
http://www.hrwf.net/html/europe_2003.html; Vatican Finds “Gaps” in European
Constitution Draft (Feb. 10, 2003), at http://www.hrwf.net/html/europe_2003. html.
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B. Reinforcing the Distinction Between Traditional and
Nontraditional Religions

A second long-term consequence of September 11 could be that
the European inclination to distinguish between traditional and
nontraditional religions⎯that is, to distinguish between religions
that are part of the historical, cultural, and social heritage of a
country and religions that are not⎯is strengthened.
Sometimes this distinction is openly expressed in legal provisions.
In Lithuania, for example, Article 43 of the constitution separates
traditional from nontraditional religions, and a law states which ones
are placed in the first or in the second class.82 In Greece, Article 3 of
the constitution proclaims that the Orthodox religion is the
prevailing religion of the country.83 In addition, a number of
northern European countries still have a state or a national church.84
Sometimes the distinction between traditional and nontraditional
religions is not explicitly stated in a country’s legal provisions but it
can easily be detected by analyzing the legal system of that country.
For example, in Poland, Italy, Spain, and in other predominantly
Catholic countries, the traditional character of Catholicism is seen in
the concordats these countries have concluded with the Catholic
Church. Although there are exceptions,85 concordats are almost
always concluded with states where Catholicism is the traditional
religion or at least, as in Germany, one of the traditional religions of
the country.
This rough description of the European system of church-state
relations would require many more distinctions and nuances: a
national church cannot be equated with a church that has concluded
a concordat, nor can a dominant religion be confused with a
traditional religion. But at least one point is clear: there are some
82. Law on Religious Communities and Associations, No. I-1057, arts. 5−6 (1995)
(Lith.).
83. GREECE CONST. art. III(1), available at http://www.hri.org/MFA/
syntagma/artcl25.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2004) (“The prevailing religion in Greece is that of
the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ.”).
84. For more information regarding these systems of church-state relations and the
reasons for their decline, see Ferrari, supra note 19.
85. Concordats have been concluded with countries where Catholicism is by no means
traditional, as in Israel and Kazakhstan. See, e.g., F. Michael Perko, Toward a “Sound and
Lasting Basis”: Relations Between the Holy See, the Zionist Movement, and Israel, 1896−1996, in
2 ISRAEL STUDIES, No. 1, at http://www.iupjournals.org/israel/iss2-1.html (last visited Mar.
5, 2004) (discussing the Fundamental Agreement of 1993 between Israel and the Vatican).
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religions that are not traditional religions anywhere in Europe. These
nontraditional religions are Islam86 and the so-called “new” religious
movements.87 Islam, however, as opposed to the “new” religions,
has played a role in Europe that no “new” religious movement can
even remotely claim. Nevertheless, Islam is not perceived, in today’s
Europe, as a traditional religion.
Islam and the “new” religious movements are the religions
raising the most acute security worries. “Radical Islam” and
“dangerous sects” are regarded as potentially troublesome groups.
Nearly everybody will admit that not all Muslim communities are
radical and not all “new” religious movements are dangerous, but
when security is discussed in the media, Islam and the new religions
are always mentioned in the newspapers and television talk shows.
Drawing
more
distinctions
between
traditional
and
nontraditional religions may address security issues without isolating
Islam or a specific “new” religious movement; isolating a religious
movement, however, might be prohibited by international and
constitutional provisions preventing states from discriminating
among religions. For example, registration requirements for
nontraditional religions could be more stringent than those for
traditional religions. Screening the practices and doctrine of
nontraditional religions could also become part of their registration
procedure. A whole set of legal restrictions could easily be applied to
nontraditional religious groups on the basis that they are foreign or
not rooted in the history and tradition of a country.
Two dangers are inherent in creating more stringent registration
requirements for nontraditional religions, however. First, more
stringent registration requirements for nontraditional religions would
widen the gap between “first class” and “second class” religions.
This gap must be narrowed, not widened, to achieve true religious
liberty in Europe. If the gap between the state support offered to
traditional and nontraditional religions is too wide, both equality and
individual religious freedom suffer. Indeed there is a relationship
between individual freedom and equality among religious groups:
the greater the inequality between them, the greater the risk that the
86. Except in some parts of the Balkans and of Russia.
87. It could also be argued that Judaism is not a traditional religion in today’s Europe,
but Judaism contributed considerably toward shaping the European identity through the
medium of Christianity. References to the Judeo-Christian roots of Europe are frequent in the
political language of the European institutions.
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freedom of each member of a less-favored group will be limited.88
Because individual religious liberty lies at the foundation of the
relationship between law and religion in the West, this danger
cannot be overlooked.
Second, excessively differentiating between traditional and
nontraditional religions would increase the distance that divides the
legal systems prevailing in Europe and in the United States, where
such a distinction is currently unknown. Greater distance between
the two legal systems would in turn result in more friction and
tension, similar to that which has already emerged in relation to
French and German policy regarding “new” religious movements,89
and would further weaken the Western model of the church-state
relationship.
V. CONCLUSION
Religious violence may not be an ephemeral phenomenon. It has
deep roots that go beyond the tensions dividing the Christian West
and part of the Islamic world. Some scholars stress that we are living
at a time of declining secular ideologies; religion is one of the
motivating forces that is left, and, in a world devoid of other strong
systems of belief, it is exploited to mobilize people for political
objectives.90 Other scholars point to the growing fear that the West,
and particularly the United States, is leading the world into
onrushing economic, technological, and ecological forces that
require uniform values. Thus, some people are tempted to “resort to
religious identity to wage a total war against this universalism, to
amplify their appeal and to obtain spiritual justification.”91 It will
take a long time to remove these deep-seated causes of religious
violence.

88. See Silvio Ferrari, Separation of Church and State in Contemporary European Society,
30 J. CHURCH & ST. 533, 543−47 (1988).
89. See the reports on International Religious Freedom published annually by the U.S.
Department of State. The latest issues are available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf
(last visited Jan. 2, 2004).
90. See Mayer, supra note 7.
91. Bob S. Hadiwinata, Terrorism, Religion and Global Politics (Dec. 6, 2002), at
http://mail2.factsoft.de/pipermail/national/2002-December/011474.html.
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Meanwhile we cannot sit and wait for a better time to come.
Religious violence must be fought. So, what can be done? The task
of the states and secular organizations is simple: they must emphasize
the fact that religiously motivated violence is unacceptable. Of
course, legal provisions embodying this message must draw careful
distinctions as discussed in Part III of this Article. If careful
distinctions are not made, then religion, instead of religious violence,
and religious freedom, instead of religious extremism, may be
criminalized. Such a result would damage precisely the security
exigencies that must be protected.
Once this message that religiously motivated violence is
unacceptable has been conveyed, states and secular organizations
have completed their task. As Lord Lloyd of Berwick observed, “It is
an illusion to believe that the fanaticism and determination of well
established terrorist organizations can be defeated by laws alone,
even of the most severe and punitive kind. . . . [T]here is no
legislative ‘fix’ or panacea against terrorism.”92 Thus, once states
have done what they can to combat religiously motivated violence,
religious communities and their leadership must complete the rest of
the task. The religious communities’ difficult task requires them to
interpret religious texts in a way that transcends the texts’ violence;
requires them to carefully reconsider the dignity afforded the
“other,” the nonfaithful or the faithful of another religion; and
requires advocating a political theology that looks sympathetically to
the secular character of the state and civil society. As John Paul II
recently said, “Ecumenical dialogue between Christians and
respectful contact with other religions, in particular with Islam, are
the best remedy for sectarian rifts, fanaticism or religious
terrorism.”93
There is no guarantee religious organizations will perform this
task successfully, but there is no alternative. It would be unwise to
rely solely on the states, which are not equipped to deal with
religious violence beyond the limited task of granting public security
and order and developing a social and political context favorable to
religious tolerance.94 Religions must handle this huge responsibility;
92.
93.
94.
European
dialogue.
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Hancock, supra note 28, pt. 2.2.1.
Pope John Paul II, supra note 10, § 7.
A step in this direction has been taken by the Ministers of the Interior of the
Union member states who approved a common declaration on interreligious
Regarding this uncommon initiative, see EU: Interreligious Dialogue Against
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it could be an opportunity for them to help shape the civil society of
the third millennium or risk the possibility of their own
marginalization.

Terrorism, For Peace (Dec. 10, 2003), at http://www.ueitalia2003.it/EN/Notizie/
affariGeneraliRelazioniEsterne/Notizia_12101835404.htm.

383

FER-FIN

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

384

7/3/2004 1:21 PM

[Summer 2004

